Paradigm shifts and defence reforms : the case of India by Bratton, Patrick
Slide 1 
ISMS Conference 
 
 
Paradigm Shifts and Defense Reforms:  
The Case of India 
 
 
Dr. Patrick Bratton 
Hawai`i Pacific University 
 
October 2015 
Slide 2 
Plan 
I. Introduction: research plan 
II. Imagining Future War 
III. Indian Civilian-Military Subcultures 
IV. Prospects for Reform 
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Contrasting Theories About Military Change 
 
Posen and 
Rynning 
  
Internal balancing: in reaction to threats, civilians will 
force internal change on reluctant militaries 
  
Kier, Nagl 
  
How do militaries and civilians “imagine” the war to be, 
given the lens of their political military subculture and  
how organizational culture can either facilitate or hamper 
learning and innovation? 
  
Bickle 
  
Bottom up learning “by doing” (informal and formal 
doctrine) 
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Research Project: 
Understanding Defense 
Reform in India 
I. Contrasting Theories of military 
change 
II. Andaman and Nicobar Command: 
I. contrasted realism and organizational 
learning theories 
II. Organization theory seemed to work 
better 
III. Constructivism and Kier 
 
 
 
Traditional Model 
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1. Pakistan Centric: 
1. Rely on conventional 
Superiority 
2. Use strike corps to 
threaten Lahore 
2. Spoilers: 1980s-Present 
1. Over nuclearization 
2. Use of violent non-state 
proxies 
 
Indian  
Internal 
Conflicts 
A. Border regions 
1) Kashmir 
2) Northeast 
B. Naxals 
C. Regional/ 
transnational terrorism: 
A. India top targets 
for terrorism 
outside Iraq and 
Afghanistan 
2000s 
B. Rise in 
sophisticated 
transnational 
groups like LeT 
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Drivers for Change and Innovation in Indian Defense 
  
1) Modernization for mechanized high-tempo conventional operations 
2) Internal security, low-intensity conflict and border constabulary duties, 
soft security issues 
3) Technology and cyber warfare vulnerabilities and capabilities 
4) Need for power projection or “out of area” capabilities?  And what 
level? 
 a. “Soft power projection”: evacuations, humanitarian assistance and 
disaster response, peacekeeping 
 b. “Hard power projection”: project power against opposing 
force/hostile resistance, military intervention/peace enforement? 
5)    Need for “military diplomacy” and international cooperation: 
development of shared norms for what militaries do and how they are 
organized 
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Cold Start? 
 A. Problem: 
A. Pakistani militants attack via 
asymmetric proxies 
B. Need to find “strategic space” to 
use conventional superiority in 
limited war 
C. Indian army is large, and much is 
tied down with border or COIN 
work 
D. Takes 30 days to mobilize, too 
slow to credibly threaten 
 
B. Cold Start “Doctrine” 
A. Be able to mobilize strike corps 
quickly 
B. Be able to provide military option 
to policymakers 
C. Advance quickly with shallow 
thrusts into Pakistani territory 
D. Destroy militant training centers, 
occupy land for diplomatic 
bargaining, threaten Lahore or 
communications with Lahore 
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Sino-Indian Rivalry: 
“Chindia” or Chasing the Dragon? 
1) Differences: 
a) 2014: 
a) China: GDP 10.4 trillion, 
7.4% growth rate, 129 B 
defense 
b) India: GDP 2.05 trillion, 
5.6% growth rate, 45.2 B 
defense 
b) China higher on indicators 
(infant mortality, life 
expectancy, etc.) 
c) China started reforms earlier 
(1979 vs. 1991) 
d) China has grown faster in 
past  
(8-9% vs. 5-7%) 
e) Global R&D spending 
PRC 14%, India 4% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Data from IISS Military Balance, The Economist, and 
Guruswamy and Singh, Chasing the Dragon 
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China-Pakistan 
Relationship 
A. Background: 
1) 1950s-60s 
2) Use Pakistan to hold India down 
3) Chinese aid to Pakistani nuclear and 
missile program  
4) Indian nuclear weapon development tied 
to China, not Pakistan? 
B. India: 
1) Goal to “De-hyphenate” 
2) Move beyond dealing with Pakistan to 
larger world 
3) Concern with China-Pakistan alliance 
C. Pakistan: 
1) Obsessed with Indian security  
threat 
a. Drives Pakistan policy towards 
China 
b. Drives Pakistan policy towards 
Afghanistan: strategic depth 
c. Use of US military aid against 
India 
d. Stability-Instability  
Paradox 
2) Danger of Pakistan as  
weak state 
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Cold Start to Two Front Doctrine? 
1) China as the great unknown? 
2) 2010 end to Cold Start Doctrine 
3) Two Front Doctrine 
4) Challenges: 
1) Mountain Strike Corps? 
2) Infrastructure catch-up 
3) Modernization of airfields 
4) Army too busy with COIN? 
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Security Concerns in Indian 
Ocean 
Net Security Provider? 
 
Soft Power Projection? 
 
Hard Power Projection? 
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Contrasting Theories About Military Change 
 
Posen and 
Rynning 
  
Internal balancing: in reaction to threats, civilians will 
force internal change on reluctant militaries 
  
Kier, Nagl 
  
How do militaries and civilians “imagine” the war to be, 
given the lens of their political military subculture and  
how organizational culture can either facilitate or hamper 
learning and innovation? 
  
Bickle 
  
Bottom up learning “by doing” (informal and formal 
doctrine) 
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Keir Imagining War  
 
Civilians 
  
Primary concern is domestic political power of military: 
Elected leaders: praetorian issue, votes 
 
Bureaucracy: power and access 
 
Public: pride in military, but concerned with other issues 
  
Military 
  
What the military believes is possible (in terms of doctrine, 
strategy etc.) given political and economic constraints: 
Army: largest service, divided: do new missions/roles 
detract from Army’s dominant role? 
 
Air Force: wants autonomy and technology 
 
Navy: Cinderella service, more interested in change 
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Constraints on Military Change in Indian Context 
 
1) Strategic Culture of Restraint: reluctance to use hard power, 
projection power 
2) Autonomy and Moral Authority: preference for soft power/moral 
leadership, reluctance to create formal alliances, complicates mil-to-
mil cooperation  
3) Continentalist World View: focus on territorial threats and 
“maritime blindness” 
4) Lack of Articulated and Open Strategic Thinking: 
a. No formal articulation of strategy 
b. Archives closed, difficult to learn from experience and  
develop SOPs 
5) Lack of integration and capacity for dialogue between civilian  
and military leaders 
Kargil 1999 
 
 
1. Questions: 
1. Why total surprise?  Intelligence failure 
2. Could India fight a tightly controlled 
limited war under nuclear conditions? 
3. Need to reform old organizations? 
2. Reform: 
1. Kargil Review Committee and Report 
1999-2000 
2. Group of Ministers Task Forces and 
Report 2001 
 
Major Defense Reforms Proposed 2001 
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Single point military advice to government 
MoD-Service Integration Integrate services with MoD, and expand 
“billets” for service members inside MoD 
Service Jointness Increase joint training, doctrine 
development, procurement, and given 
incentives/requirements for joint service  
for promotion 
Joint Commands Theatre Commands: predeployment of 
assets to specific geographic commands,  
all service forces are under the operational 
command of a joint commander 
Functional Commands: pooling assets of a 
similar function to be controlled by joint 
commander 
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Military and Civilian Subcultures 
Reform Minded Traditional 
Navy Air Force 
Army Futurists Army Traditionalists 
Defence Intellectuals Bureaucracy? 
Politicians Politicians? 
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Civil-Military Relations 
A. Civilian control: 
1) System set in late 1940s 
2) Separation of MoD and 
Services 
3) Lack of constructive dialogue 
4) Autonomous military 
5) No “jointness” in military 
6) Paradox: 
a. Military complain about lack of 
influence 
b. Military like (and chose) 
autonomy 
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Public Opinion 
 
 
Indian public feels that for India, the important tools to achieve its 
goals include the military and nuclear weapons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: all poll data from Lowy India Poll 2013 
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Public 
Opinion 
 
 
However, the major 
security and political 
issues that concern 
them are 
“governance” and 
soft security issues: 
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KRC and GoM Results 
A. Compromise 
B. No CDS, COSC and IDS, not effective 
C. Two “experimental commands” 
1) Functional: Strategic Forces Command 
a. Nuclear 
b. Conceptual/training command 
2) Theatre: Andaman and Nicobar 
a. Policing role 
b. Conceptual training laboratory  
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Lost Opportunities 2001-14? 
A. Assessment: 
1) GoM wanted assessment after 5 years 
2) Narendra Chandra Task Force 2011-13 
B. Future? 
1) Doubtful more theatre commands near future 
2) No CDS 
a. 2012 civ-mil crisis with Army Chief VK Singh 
b. Watered down CoCS? 
3) Functional commands: space, special forces, cyber 
C. Those who call for reform and paradigm shift in Indian security are not 
dominant: 
1) Focus on governance and internal security 
2) The need for power projection and “the China threat” are contested 
and not universally agreed upon (reluctance to muscle flex) 
3) No paradigm shift to make radical reform necessary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Change under Modi? 
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1. Indian Ocean Region Focus: 
1. India as leader of South Asia: 
1. SAARC leaders (+Tibet) invited inauguration 
2. Modi/India as leader of South Asia 
3. Border settlement with Bangladesh  
2. Maritime Focus: “removing the maritime cataract” 
1. Maritime security and navy  
2. Modi’s “Maritime Vision”  
3. Mountain strike corps scaled back for maritime? 
3. Reaching out to Diaspora: 
1. Visits to Mauritius, Fiji 
2. US, Australia, Canada etc. 
 
2. Improve defense cooperation: make in India, skill India 
1. US:  
1. Joint Strategic Vision for the  Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions 
2. Defense Trade and Technology Initiative: aircraft carriers, UAVs, etc. 
2. Russia, France, Israel, Japan 
3. Defence reform: 
1. Procurement and development, “Make in India”? 
2. COCS and functional commands (Special Ops, Space, Cyber)? 
3. One Rank, one pension issue has derailed government’s relationship with 
military 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions? 
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Defense Reforms and Modernization remain slow 
 “RMA has passed India by” 
 Focus on replacing obsolescent equipment, 
 rather than qualitative updates to combat 
 capabilities 
 
No consensus on need for change: 
 Civilians ambivalent: 
  Concerns over domestic power 
  Defense not electoral issue 
 Military divided 
  Meet current demands 
  Meeting future challenges 
 
Watch maritime and defence cooperation issues 
